Comments on the absence of input from business, executive remuneration, separation of roles, application of the code to smaller listed companies and various aspects of auditing. Also includes comments on specific paragraphs.
Covers all aspects of report and follow up.
The letter has attached detailed suggested refinements when the code is applied to smaller quoted companies.
Expresses concern about tone and prescriptiveness of the report with regard to non-executive directors.
Covers full range of the report.
Davies, Arnold, Cooper proposes insurance for non-executive directors. Transparency International asks for support for its cause. Wilton proposes greater involvement of institutional shareholders.
Main purpose of the Committee was to strengthen the position of the auditor and clarify the responsibilities of the directors. Two vulnerabilities identified were accountability to the worker and the small shareholder.
Comments on the role of internal auditors.
9. Correspondence from Ron Dearing, Financial Reporting Council, including responses to the draft report from ICAEW, Rowena Mills Associates, Delta plc and Sears plc between 1 May 1992 and 23 July 1992.
Includes comments on differentiation between executive and non-executive board members, role of auditors and non-audit fees. Memo from Nigel Peace included.
The comments of individuals are marked by their initials.
Comments on potential for statements of conformity to become meaningless, possible progress to an international accounting regime and institutional shareholders, plus detailed comments.
Lists organisations, companies and individuals who submitted evidence to the Committee, and meeting notes and published documents.
Letter expresses support for the draft report.
Comments on voluntary nature of compliance, internal control systems and comments on specific paragraphs.
15. Report on a pilot study on attitudes toward the issues of corporate governance, a presentation by Angus Maitland, Burson-Marsteller at CBI/B-M conference on Corporate Governance 10 June 1992 and reply by Nigel Peace.
Reports the results of a survey. Auditors are least likely to benefit while non-executive directors benefit most. Responsibility for compliance lies with company management and institutional shareholders or Stock Exchange, while expresses doubts over self-regulation.
Letter welcomes the draft report and makes two suggestions for the final report.
Further comments on the Committee's report, specifically the Code of Best Practice and auditors role.
Comments that serious problems shareholders face, on remuneration committees and the Caparo case. Includes memo from Nigel Peace.
Suggests an additional entry on the form about directors understanding their duties.
Includes comments on audit committees, the role of auditors, board effectiveness and internal system controls.
Comments on the wording re independence of non-executive directors.
Comments that fraud is very difficult to prevent and comments on non-executive directors and auditing, especially their resignation advice.
Comments on enforcement, adoption and efficacy, control structures, role of the board of directors, audit committees and director accountability.
Comments on institutional investors, non-executive directors and internal auditors.
Comments on the provisions for non-executive directors to take advice and their roles and responsibilities, independence of auditors, directors' remuneration.
Comments on voluntary nature of the code, non-executive directors, the role of audit committees, directors' contracts and the independence of auditors.
Seeks and gives clarification on the meaning of independent in relation to non-executive directors.
This is a workshop exercise on the role of the directors in Eurotunnel delivered at the ICAEW conference . It is used to comment on unitary boards, separation of roles of Chairman and Chief Executive, non-executive directors and institutional investors.
Comments on the application of the code to smaller companies.
Comments on the application of the code to smaller companies.
Comments on non-executive directors, financial reporting, auditing and institutional shareholders.
Hirst expresses concern about the suggestion that non-executive directors should only serve on one board.
Comments on separation of roles of Chairman and Chief Executive, independent non-executive directors and directors service contracts and the independence of auditors.
Legal Practice Directorate Memorandum no. 271. It comments on the application of the code to smaller companies.
Comments on potential for two-tier boards, non-executive directors entitlement to take independent professional advice, internal control systems and going concern.
An invitation to make a presentation about the draft report to an evening meeting open to all company secretaries.
Comments on non-executive directors vs directors and audit committees.
Includes a paper on European accounting, audit independenc and regulation.
Comments on lack of audited accounts for a fund managed by the Nationwide Building Society.
Comments on the role of the company secretary in corporate governance and directors' access to information.
Suggests appointing an 'audit trustee' appointed by lenders and creditors rather than the board.
Author suggests that an 'Appointed Accountant' with responsibility for preparing financial reports, should be employed.
Comments on appearing to be written with best interests of directors, and aspects of auditing.
Comments on the delegation of powers by the board to the subcommittees.
Comments on self-regulatory approach, separation of roles of Chairman and Chief Executive and non-executive directors, directors' remuneration and financial reporting.
Comments on independence of auditors, audit committees and non-executive directors.
Letter informs that Allied Lyons complies with the code although the appointmentof non-executive directors is informal and would prefer a voluntary code.
Comments on involvement of non-executive directors in strategic direction of companies.
Comments mostly on the role of employees.
Warns against a prescriptive approach, that effectively promotes two-tier boards.